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Flooding is not generally ƌegaƌded as ďeiŶg the kiŶd of hazaƌd that is sǇŵptoŵatiĐ of a ͚‘isk “oĐietǇ͛ ;BeĐk ϭϵϵϮͿ, iŶ 
which dangers arise as unintended by-products of technological modernisation and an unquestioning faith in the 
ability of science to solve social and environmental problems.  However, this chapter explores policy change and 
the results of two research projects conducted with flood-exposed and affected communities, to argue that the 
recent shift towards the Flood Risk Management (FRM) approach, with its associated shift of responsibility towards 
the individual, is, indeed, an example of the risk society at work.  In short, decades of support for structural 
solutions, combined with the increasing challenges of climate change, have allowed the expansion of communities 
into flood-prone areas, thus increasing the risks to individuals when these defences fail.  The research results we 
pƌeseŶt heƌe illustƌate hoǁ the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s poliĐǇ of ͚MakiŶg “paĐe foƌ Wateƌ͛ ;Department for Food and Rural 
Affairs 2005) is played out in practice, with consequences for how risk and resilience is experienced by the 
communities concerned.  We conclude by arguing for citizens to be more involved in the decisions that are made 
around flood risk management and for better support for the process of flood recovery. 
From flood defence to flood risk management: policy change from 1940 to the present day 
The relationships between exposure, vulnerability and resilience to hazards have been much debated (e.g. Adger 
2000, Adger 2006, Birkmann 2006, Hewitt 1997, Pelling 2003a, Wisner et al., 2004).  In relation to flooding, these 
concepts have been used to describe the changing macro- and micro-social and political processes that have 
guided the human development of floodplains.  As far back as 1945, Gilbert White called for a critical examination 
of the assuŵptioŶs ďeiŶg ŵade iŶ ƌelatioŶ to hoǁ ͚adjustŵeŶt ŵeasuƌes͛ ǁere being used to justify floodplain 
encroachment (White 1945).  His concern, even then, was that some floodplains in the US were being used in ways 
that increased the exposure of communities living in low-lying areas to flood hazards, thereby exacerbating flood 
risks.  Yet floodplain development has continued into the 21st Century; a phenomenon that remains accountable 
to the legacy of historical decisions, which initiated and then normalised such practice long before White wrote his 
thesis (Doe 2006).  In the UK, this could be argued to have occurred largely because the benefits of using this land 
have continued to be perceived to outweigh the costs, of either mitigating the most frequent hazards, or of 
suffering the consequences of the more infrequent extreme events.  For a relatively small, densely populated 
island, part of this benefit/cost equation undoubtedly relates to the fact that floodplains represent such a large 
proportion of useful and useable land (Kelman 2003).   
Johnson et al (2005b) identify three phases of flood management within England and Wales, which illustrate a 
gradual progression of policy priorities since the mid-20
th
 Century.  The first phase followed severe fluvial flooding 
in 1947 and the east-coast storm surge of 1953, which both affected agricultural yields; even if only for a relatively 
short time (Johnson et al. 2005a).  This loss of production represented a substantial risk to food security, whose 
sensitivity to perturbation had already been severely tested during the war years.  The first phase of flood control, 
therefore, ran from the time of war and post-war austerity in the 1940s to the 1980s, with activity during this 
phase concentrated on land drainage in support of agricultural productivity.     
Due to the changing role of global markets, from the 1980s to the 1990s, a reorientation occurred.  This second 
phase refocused attention away from agricultural productivity and toǁaƌd assuƌiŶg the ŶatioŶ͛s wider economic 
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security.  This shift was designed to enable economic growth and social-welfare improvements to be driven by the 
urban and commercial developŵeŶt of the ŶatioŶ͛s floodplaiŶ; ǁith haƌd-engineered measures being used to 
prevent inundations.  Unfortunately, however, it could be said that this was the period that raised the paradox of 
flood control into sharp relief.  Parker (1995) christened a major part of this paradox the ͚escalator effect͛.  This 
concept was predicated upon the observation that this type of adjustment measure meant that the investment in 
flood defences led to increased investment in floodplain development, which in turn led to the need for more 
investment in flood defence; thus ͚esĐalatiŶg͛ ƌisks.  By the 1990s this approach was beginning to attract criticism, 
with increasingly clarion calls being directed at ͚engineering hubris, disaster-denial mentality and a willingness to 
pursue short-term profit in the face of long-term risk’  (Mount 1998) bearing more responsibility than any increase 
in hazard frequency for the rising flood losses that were being experienced (e.g. Barredo 2009).  It was becoming 
clear, therefore, that White͛s ǁoƌds had been pƌophetiĐ, aŶd that theƌe ǁas a Ŷeed to ƌeĐoŶsideƌ soĐietǇ͛s 
relationship with floods.     
Another influence that was driving this tension was the growing consensus amongst the clear majority of scientists 
that something was happening to the global climate.  By 2007 this consensus was to develop sufficiently for it to 
represent an understanding (with more than 90% confidence), that human activity had been the dominant cause 
of observed climate changes in the latter part of the 20
th
 Century (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
2008).  It was this growing recognition of climate change that was to foment the development of the climate-
model projections (e.g. Hulme et al. 2002, Jenkins et al. 2009), which were to inform the third phase of flood 
management; the Flood Risk Management (FRM) approach (Tunstall et al. 2004).  In fact plans developed through 
the use of these climate and catchment models serve to epitomise the FRM approach as it is now practiced in the 
UK, across Europe and in the US (European Commission 2006, Defra 2005, United States Army Corps of Engineers 
2009).    
The significance of this shift to FRM is that it recognises that not all floods can be prevented.  Consequently, it 
reinforces the need to better understand the ways in which different social and physical interventions can 
contribute to improving flood resilience
2
 and resistance, through achieving the combined social, economic and 
environmental goals inhered within the wider sustainable development discourse (Water Directors of the 
European Union 2004).  Flood policy is now orientated toward the communication of risk information to the 
population, and on working in partnership with both the hazard-exposed and the greater society, toward building 
resilience across scales; whilst accepting that this resilience will be tested.  In the UK this approach has been rather 
euphemistically termed ͚Making Space for Wateƌ͛ ďǇ the DepaƌtŵeŶt foƌ Food aŶd ‘uƌal Affaiƌs ;Defƌa 2005). 
Despite this change of emphasis away from hard engineering solutions, in England and Wales, expenditure on 
flood defence is currently higher than at any time in history (Environment Agency, 2009) while the residual risks 
associated with the range of flood hazards are also recognised as being larger than ever before (Association of 
British Insurers 2006, Association of British Insurers 2007, Risk Management Solutions 2003).   One consequence of 
this is that FRM approaches now incorporate a shift of responsibility towards individuals, which proposes that, 
͚ǁheƌe appƌopƌiate͛, individuals, households and social networks should be encouraged to mitigate their own risks 
autonomously.  People aƌe effeĐtiǀelǇ ďeiŶg eŶĐouƌaged to ͞kŶoǁ͟ the ƌisks theǇ faĐe aŶd to take peƌsoŶal 
responsibility for adapting to those risks (Water Directors of the European Union 2004).   This is a laudable goal.  
However, it should be remembered that the prevailing structure, transparency and participatory openness of FRM 
institutions, and the accent of the policies by which they are bound, cannot be thought of without also considering 
the legacy of earlier approaches, which had a role iŶ deteƌŵiŶiŶg the Ŷatuƌe of ďoth a populatioŶ͛s vulnerability 
and its capacity for resilience (Wisner 2001).  The next section seeks to delineate why this legacy of policy changes 
means that the public cannot simply be expected to accept such an individualisation of flood risk responsibility on 
trust. 
Floods and the Risk Society 
In his original Risk Society thesis, Beck (1992) suggested that the pervasive effects of globalisation, social reflexivity 
and the onset of a post-traditional social order have combined to create a society of individuals who regard the 
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 For a discussion of resilience as a concept that can variously refer to: resistance; bounce-back; adaptation; or transformation, see 
Whittle et al. (2010). 
post-industrial world with doubt, reflexivity and anxiety.  BeĐk͛s ǁoƌk is ŵoƌe ofteŶ assoĐiated ǁith ͚teĐhŶologiĐal͛ 
ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚Ŷatuƌal͛ hazaƌds ;Walkeƌ et al. ϮϬϭϬͿ aŶd, theƌefoƌe, floods aƌe Ŷot a ͚tǇpiĐal͛ Đase.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, as ǁe 
illustrate here, the instrumentalist ways in which floods have been managed across preceding decades has had the 
unintended consequence of increasing the risks to life and property when flood defences fail.  This, together with 
the increase in extreme weather events which constitute the predicted impact of human-induced climate change, 
ŵeaŶs that floods ĐaŶŶot ďe uŶdeƌstood as puƌelǇ ͚Ŷatuƌal͛ hazaƌds.  Vieǁed iŶ this ǁaǇ the ŵost ƌeĐeŶt iteƌatioŶ 
of F‘M pƌoǀides us ǁith a Đleaƌ eǆaŵple of hoǁ BeĐk͛s thesis ĐaŶ ďe applied to certain aspects of flood risk.   
 
The proliferation of floodplain development and the reliance on technical risk-assessment techniques in the 
construction of defence measures (e.g. benefit/cost analyses) has, in effect, exposed situated and ͚tƌustiŶg͛, 
publics to potential harm.  To illustrate this point, think about the residents of a new bungalow development on 
the coast: surely these people should be able to trust that the same authorities who granted planning permission 
foƌ theiƌ hoŵes to ďe ďuilt ǁill also ďeaƌ the lioŶ͛s shaƌe of the ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ foƌ pƌeventing those same properties 
from flooding?  And yet flood defences do fail, often with disastrous consequences, as the summer floods that 
affected the UK in 2007, made only too clear (Pitt 2008) (Plate 1). 
<<<Plate 1 here>>>  
From this perspective, the threat from flooding can be seen as analogous to the persistent threats from nuclear, 
chemical and GM technology and the other global threats around which the risk-society thesis is constructed.  One 
could, for eǆaŵple, ƌegaƌd Paƌkeƌ͛s ͚esĐalatoƌ effeĐt͛ ;ϭϵϵ5Ϳ as oŶe of BeĐk͛s ͚ƌesidual͛ ƌisks iŶ microcosm; in that it 
is a vestige of a particular industrial era, when hubris dictated that all flood hazards could be controlled.  Use of 
this lens facilitates an interpretation that the recent policy shift toward greater individual responsibility for 
personal flood-risk management could leave the public startled at the reflex-like nature of the policy re-
orientation.  Such an analogy fits well with BeĐk͛s oǁŶ defiŶitioŶ; as an example of entry into risk society occurring: 
… at the ŵoŵeŶt ǁheŶ hazaƌds ǁhiĐh aƌe Ŷoǁ deĐided aŶd ĐoŶseƋueŶtlǇ pƌoduĐed ďǇ soĐietǇ undermine and / or 
ĐaŶĐel the estaďlished safetǇ sǇsteŵs of the provideŶt state͛s eǆistiŶg risk ĐalĐulatioŶs (Beck 2000: emphasis in 
original). 
Fleshing out this example, policy-makers conferring the new FRM mandate could be perceived as effectively 
ƌeŶegiŶg oŶ the state͛s histoƌiĐal aŶd soĐiallǇ-deemed responsibility for flood-risk mitigation, at the very time 
when the global threat of climatic instability is projected to intensify future flood hazards and/or make them more 
frequent (Alcamo et al. 2007, Evans et al. 2008).  Society, from this perspective, could be seen as being left 
atomised in the face of uncertain, and perhaps indeterminate, levels of residual risk (i.e. that which remains after 
the iŶsuƌaŶĐe pƌoǀided ďǇ ͚estaďlished safetǇ sǇsteŵs͛ is oǀeƌǁhelŵed3). 
Having set the scene as regards the recent evolution of FRM approaches, the discussion will now move on to 
investigate how risk-society reflexivity could be said to be exhibited by populations living on particular floodplains 
in England.  This will be done through the interrogation of data from two recent research projects that purposively 
engaged populations exposed to or affected by surface-water and sea flood hazards.   
The two projects took place between 2007 and 2009 and, as the following descriptions illustrate, these were 
separate studies, which had different aims and methodologies. However, taken together, the projects provide us 
with an interesting picture of how flood risk is individualised, perceived and managed. Indeed, by exploring the 
results from both projects, we can follow the ways in which understandings of risk evolve across the hazard cycle, 
from hazard-exposed populations who have not experienced a flood eǀeŶt ;the ͚ďefoƌe͛ project), to those with 
ƌeĐeŶt eǆpeƌieŶĐe of ƌeĐoǀeƌiŶg fƌoŵ a ŵajoƌ flood ;the ͚afteƌ͛ pƌojeĐtͿ. The folloǁiŶg seĐtioŶ desĐƌiďes the 
methodologies of the projects.     
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 This does not mean insurance in the sense of private policies provided by the insurance industry, but the insurance inhered 
within state-funded risk mitigation measures (e.g. seawalls built to a 1:200 standard of protection, wherein the residual risk is 
defined as that which would be realised if the structure was subjected to, for example, a 1:400 hazard event). 
The research projects 
The ͚Before͛ 
During 2007 a research project (Deeming 2008) was conducted in three English coastal towns (Cleveleys, 
Mablethorpe and Morecambe).  All of these towns had a history of sea flooding, although none had suffered a 
significant event since at least 1990 (Morecambe).  Notwithstanding, ongoing concerns over climate change effects 
related to storm-surge flooding are increasingly suggestive that more intense and frequent sea flooding may occur 
in the future (East Lindsay District Council 2005, Lancaster City Council 2007, Morecambe Bay Shoreline 
Management Plan Partnership 1999); therefore, the aim of the project was to investigate how risk perceptions 
influenced the levels of community resilience to this low-probability but high-consequence hazard in these towns.  
The research methods consisted of a survey questionnaire, delivered using a random-systematic approach (n = 
343).  The survey included a relatively unusual proportion of open questions, which were designed to draw 
unprompted opinions and attitudes from the respondents.  For example, two questions the respondents were 
required to answer in their own words were: 
 Can you suggest three things which you could do if you got a warning that your street (including 
your home) was going to be flooded in the next few hours?  What, if anything, do you think could be done in [town name] to help the town cope with 
flooding in the future? 
This first method of collecting information from the public was followed up by a series of focus groups conducted 
with volunteers recruited from respondents to the initial survey (participants = 24).  Analysis of the data took a 
grounded-theory approach, wherein themes were identified from within the rich datasets, and potential causal 
relationships behind these themes were hypothesised.      
The ͚After͛ 
Following the summer floods of 2007, a team from Lancaster University travelled to Hull, where over 8,600 homes 
were affected and one person died (Coulthard et al. 2007b), in order to carry out an 18-month long investigation 
into what the long-term flood recovery process was like for people (Whittle et al. 2010). During the study, the 
researchers worked with 42 flooded residents using in-depth qualitative techniques designed to capture the 
recovery process in real time. The methods were based on established techniques that were used successfully in a 
pƌeǀious studǇ ǁhiĐh iŶǀestigated the ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛s ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ fƌoŵ the ϮϬϬϭ Foot aŶd Mouth Disease outďƌeak iŶ 
Cumbria (Mort et al. 2004). Upon recruitment, the participants gave an initial semi-structured interview which 
enabled them to tell their story of the floods so far. At this point they were introduced to the weekly diary booklets 
that they were encouraged to keep throughout the duration of the project. The diaries started with a few simple 
͚ǁaƌŵ up͛ ƋuestioŶs ǁheƌe paƌtiĐipaŶts were asked to rate their quality of life, relationships with family and 
fƌieŶds, aŶd health usiŶg a siŵple sĐale ƌaŶgiŶg fƌoŵ ͚ǀeƌǇ pooƌ͛ to ͚ǀeƌǇ good͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the ŵaiŶ seĐtioŶ of the 
diaƌies ǁas the ͚fƌee-teǆt͛ paƌt, ǁheƌe theǇ ǁeƌe eŶĐouƌaged to ǁƌite aďout theiƌ liǀes that ǁeek. To complement 
the diaries and interviews, the participants also met for group discussions at quarterly intervals during the project 
where they were able to discuss the issues that were facing them as a group. 
The final element of the methodology was a project steering group, which comprised local and national 
organisations with an interest in flood recovery
4
.  During the study the diarists engaged directly with the steering 
group through a series of group discussions and facilitated meetings, resulting in a high level of impact on policy 
and practice (Whittle et al. 2010).  For example, the project was used as a case study during the development of 
the CaďiŶet OffiĐe͛s Dƌaft Fƌaŵeǁoƌk oŶ Coŵŵunity Resilience (Cabinet Office 2010).   
We now move on to discuss what the projects can teach us about the ways in which the flood risk society could be 
said to be created, understood and managed. 
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 The Hull Study had a steering group comprising the following organizations: Association of British Insurers, Humber Primary 
Care Trust, Cabinet Office, JBA Consulting, Diarist, Middlesex University, Environment Agency, National Flood Forum, Hull City 
Council, North Bank Forum, Hull Community and Voluntary Services, University of Cumbria, Hull Residents and Tenants 
Association, Yorkshire & Humber Neighbourhood Resource Centre. 
Results and Analysis: Experiencing residual [flood] risk society 
͚Before͛ 
The research project conducted in the three coastal towns was designed with a focus on a particular sea-flood 
hazard; storm surge.  However, from the first stages of survey analysis it became clear that the population in these 
towns had a wider breadth of interest.  For these people, flood hazards could be differentiated into two main 
types; storm surge and surface water.  Storm-suƌge floodiŶg, ǁhiĐh hadŶ͛t ďeeŶ eǆpeƌieŶĐed foƌ at least ϭϳ Ǉeaƌs 
was perceived as an acute threat, whilst surface-water (i.e. drainage excess) flooding was something that was 
prevalent and even chronic at the street scale.  As a result of this the hazards invoked very different risk 
perceptions and feelings of personal efficacy and responsibility regarding risk mitigation. 
As a useful way to visualise how these exposed publics perceived how different groups of stakeholders quantify 
(whether personally or within their institutionalised structures) the uncertainties related to the local flooding, 
Figuƌe ϭ applies the ĐoŶĐept of the ͚ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ tƌough͛ to shoǁ the peƌĐeptioŶ diffeƌeŶtiatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ the tǁo 
hazards.  The certainty trough concept was originally devised by MacKenzie (1990), who contended that certainty 
in relation to the use of scientific knowledge can be conceptualised as forming a trough shape, as the knowledge is 
produced and then utilised by agents progressively further away from this inception point.  MacKenzie illustrated 
his concept by categorising three groups, through which the knowledge passes: namely; the knowledge producers, 
the program loyalists, and the alienated.   
<<<Figure 1 about here>>> 
In Figure 1, the solid line describes the public͛s apparent perceptions of uncertainty, as it relates to surface-water 
flooding. Here the perception is that formal actors (e.g. Sir Michael Pitt) and flood policy-makers (e.g. Defra) 
represent the ͚kŶowledge producers’.  These actors are perceived to be aware of considerable uncertainty in 
relation to the prediction of surface-water flood hazards, particularly at the local-scale (Bales & Wagner 2009, Pitt 
2008). However, when, in this example, the knowledge moves to the Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) (i.e. the 
͚prograŵ loyalists’), it is apparent that the public perceives that the officers of these institutions justify to 
themselves that surface-water hazards can be understood with high levels of certainty.  The puďliĐ͛s peƌĐeptioŶ is 
that this is what allows the officers to continue to grant planning applications in the towns, without insisting on the 
implementation of adequate flood mitigation measures.  From here the trough is formed, as the knowledge passes 
to the ͚alieŶated’.  At this final stage the public, who have witnessed chronic flooding at its most localised scale, yet 
ǁhose ͚laǇ͛ opiŶioŶ theǇ feel is rarely sought or considered, perceive the highest uncertainty of all.  This perception 
enhances the feelings of frustration because this is the group that perceives and/or experiences hazards and risks 
accumulating around them.   
Such a situation can result in several responses.  The public can (1) philosophically accept their situation; (2) they 
can seek to blame others for failing to control surface-water effectively or, (3) they can make themselves more 
resilient.  Whilst the first two options are clearly of limited value in relation to resilience-building, the third too 
should not be considered as being a wholly positive phenomenon.  It is true that if a problem is chronic enough 
and if the person has sufficient perceived self-efficacy – and financial resources – to mitigate the problem 
(Grothmann & Reusswig 2006) then they can and do install measures such as air-brick covers, sandbags and sump 
pumps.  This is positive, as too is the fact that the data analysis revealed that these actions were often carried out 
by older people (an oft-cited vulnerable group).  However, in this category of uncertainty perception, these actions 
need to be understood as being undertaken in the sense of (to paraphrase) ͚No one else is going to do anything 
aďout this so it͛s doǁŶ to ŵe!͛  Whilst the resilience such responses can engender could be regarded positively, it 
could also be considered as having been attained through rather Machiavellian means.  This situation should beg 
the question; is it ethical to justify such ends (i.e. increased resilience) when, ultimately, the means of achieving it 
ƌelies, effeĐtiǀelǇ, oŶ the peƌpetuatioŶ of the puďliĐ͛s peƌĐeptioŶs that risks are being managed ineffectively?     
Conversely, the dashed line in Figure 1 relates to low-probability storm-surge flooding.  Here, the uncertainties 
inherent in the production of knowledge, as it relates to the prediction of extreme events and to the designed 
resistance of sea defence measures, is implicit in a lower perceived initial uncertainty being attributed to the 
͚kŶoǁledge producers͛5.  From here the uncertainty perceptions are lowered, as the knowledge passes to local 
decision makers; the ͚pƌogƌaŵŵe loǇalists͛.  This is the point at which decisions are written into local development 
policy.  It is, therefore, here that the sustainability of coastal communities is balanced against the risks of a low-
probability hazard.  In effect, it appeared that local authorities were perceived to need to believe that their 
communities are defended to the highest standard, in order that investment could be attracted and blight avoided.  
This interpretation was reinforced by a quote from a local councilor who was interviewed as part of the project:   
At the ŵoŵeŶt … the Chief EǆeĐutiǀe aŶd the Leadeƌ of the CouŶĐil ďoth haǀe the attitude that, Ǉou kŶoǁ, the sea is 
theƌe, ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot goiŶg to let it Đoŵe iŶ.  We͛ǀe had huŶdƌeds of Ǉeaƌs of pushing it back, pushing it back, pushing it 
ďaĐk, ǁe͛ƌe holdiŶg the liŶe.  AŶd theǇ͛ǀe got to haǀe that stoƌǇ or else the town is so fragile (Interviewee, 
Mablethorpe, January 2007). 
From here, however, the trajectory of the knowledge diverges from the path taken for surface-water flooding.  In 
this illustration, the ͚alienated͛ publics are also attributed as perceiving low uncertainties.  This perception allows 
people to regard the sea with ambivalence.  People know the threat is there (e.g. the North Sea floods of 1953 
cannot be denied).  Therefore, the sea represents a putative threat.  However, the fact that these events are rare 
suggests that this is a ͚low-probability threat͛.  This message is further reinforced by the words and actions of those 
who are understood to be responsible for community sustainability (e.g. it is implicit in the decades-long practice 
of granting planning permission for seaside bungalows).  The public are, therefore, able to peƌĐeiǀe ͞loǁ 
pƌoďaďilitǇ͟ as meaning that it is Ŷot goiŶg to happeŶ to ͚theŵ͛ and that if it did then they ǁould ďe ͚uŶluĐkǇ͛.  Sea 
floodiŶg ďeĐoŵes aŶ ͞AĐt of God͟ aŶd sea defeŶĐes are simultaneously perceived as both impregnable and yet 
latently vulnerable.   
It has been suggested that people with a limited knowledge of certain hazards have a tendency to trust the 
organisations they deem to be responsible for managing those hazards to mitigate the risks to which they are 
exposed (Siegrist & Cvetkovich 2000).  From a flood-risk perspective, therefore, being able to trust that someone is 
maintaining the standard of sea defences or the drainage infrastructure, or that someone will issue warnings in 
time, allows individuals to perceive that they are exposing themselves to lesser personal risks (Freudenburg 1993). 
It is this trust that could, in effect, be argued to have produced the perceived division of labour – i.e. the 
authorities use tax revenue to protect the public, which allows the public to work and pay their taxes in order to 
sustain the economy – that both cognitively sanctions and perpetuates the risk-taking of those who continue to 
make the floodplain their home.  The public has a vested interest in ignoring even concerted efforts by the 
responsible authorities in their promotion of the need to build individual resilience to low-probability hazards; 
regardless of whether such aspirational policy is based on sound science or not.  This finding clearly echoes the 
results from an international research project into social vulnerability:  
Most of those suƌǀeǇed doŶ͛t feel iŶǀolǀed iŶ the deĐisioŶ ŵakiŶg pƌoĐesses aŶd teŶd to delegate ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ – to 
agencies in charge of flood prevention and mitigation. Thus, precautionary measures and flood defence are first and 
foremost regarded as pertaining to public institutions.  Such attitudes originate a vicious circle.  Public authorities feel 
the iŶĐƌeasiŶg pƌessuƌe fƌoŵ the ƌesideŶts͛ deŵaŶds foƌ assistaŶĐe aŶd, ďǇ positiǀelǇ ƌespoŶdiŶg to it, fuƌtheƌ aŵplifǇ 
its magnitude and the ĐitizeŶs͛ tendency not to invest in prevention (Steinführer & Kuhlicke 2009: emphasis in 
original). 
Having identified some specific social risk-related phenomena, illustrated by a hazard-exposed population, the 
discussion will now move on to investigate how a hazard-affected population was found to rationalise its 
experience in terms of how risks were realised relative to how they were previously perceived.  
͚After͛ 
The ͚ďefoƌe͛ Đase studǇ ĐleaƌlǇ shoǁs hoǁ a ƌisk soĐietǇ is Đƌeated iŶ ƌelatioŶ to floodiŶg. IŶ paƌtiĐu lar, we can see 
how the ways in which people understand and manage risks cannot be separated from the macro-scale policy 
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 However, consider Muir-Wood et al. (2005) for a discussion of whether low uncertainty, as perceived by the ͚knowledge 
producers͛ in relation to storm-surge hazards, can actually be equated with low risk.  Muir-Wood illustrates that whilst flood 
probabilities are calculable to an extent and, therefore, uncertainties are relatively low, this does not mean that the residual 
risks associated with an extreme event are reduced at all. 
deĐisioŶs that aƌe ŵade aďout floodiŶg. The ͚afteƌ͛ Đase studǇ shoǁs these saŵe pƌoĐesses oĐĐuƌƌiŶg. The Hull 
flood was a surface water flood aŶd, as a ƌesult, theƌe ǁas geŶeƌal agƌeeŵeŶt fƌoŵ the paƌtiĐipaŶts that the ĐitǇ͛s 
drainage infrastructure had been found vulnerable.  Issues of inadequate maintenance, and failure by local 
authorities to adequately enforce sustainable drainage management as part of the planning process (and in spite 
of local protests) were perceived to have exacerbated the consequences.  For example: 
The thiŶg is I ŵeaŶ, the seǁeƌage sǇsteŵ is so aŶĐieŶt isŶ͛t it? If you are going round the back of Asda, in that area, to 
ŵǇ kŶoǁledge theƌe͛s at least fiǀe Ŷeǁ ďuildiŶg ΀deǀelopŵeŶts΁, theƌe͛s Daǀid WilsoŶ Hoŵes, theƌe͛s PeƌsiŵŵoŶ, 
theƌe͛s WiŵpǇ͛s – I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ hoǁ ŵany, all with these new beautiful properties all being built.  They were flooded 
while they were still ďeiŶg ďuilt, theƌe͛s still caravans outside these properties.  I mean we complained when they 
started to build Kingswood, there was a petition up not to build it ďeĐause Ǉou kŶoǁ the pƌopeƌties, theƌe͛s nowhere 
for them to go, the drainage system is so old.  They are building another, about six companies, are still building in the 
same vicinity (͚Elizaďeth͛6, resident Group discussion, April 24th 2008).    
“uĐh ĐoŵŵeŶts ƌeǀealed ǀeƌǇ ĐleaƌlǇ that, foƌ ŵaŶǇ, faƌ fƌoŵ ďeiŶg ĐoŶsideƌed ͚AĐts of God͛ these floods were 
ƌegaƌded as ƌesultiŶg fƌoŵ ͚soĐial͛ faĐtoƌs; just as ǁeƌe the suƌfaĐe-water hazards on the coast mentioned above.  
Importantly, this particular social construction of flood risk can be attributed to one principal factor: namely that 
the drainage infrastructure in the city had, overall, onlǇ eǀeƌ ďeeŶ ƌeƋuiƌed to ŵeet a ͚rather vague͛ industry 
standard of protection (i.e. 1 in 30 year
7
: Coulthard et al. 2007a).  Therefore, an event that achieved a calculated 
͚gƌeateƌ thaŶ ϭ iŶ ϭ5Ϭ Ǉeaƌ͛ iŶteŶsitǇ (as occurred on June 7th 2007), was inevitably going to lead to extensive 
flooding.  The population of Hull had, effectively, been living with a time-bomb of residual flood risk long before 
those June clouds even formed. 
Regardless of this inevitability, however, blame for what had happened led to frustration and anger.   Despite the 
severity of the hazard, physical effects were attributed to inadequate preparation and response by the agencies 
and organisations. For example: 
Five years ago the council had decided that they were going to save money and they reduced the drain cleaning from 
five teams to one team.  Now when you look at cities like Rotherham, places like that, they have 20 teams.  Well it 
doesŶ͛t take a brain surgeon to see that we have one team (͚Jaŵes͛, Gƌoup DisĐussioŶ, Hull, MaǇ ϭst 2009).       
 And  
We ǁeƌe like sittiŶg duĐks iŶ the ŵiddle… all the ďuses kept goiŶg past aŶd loƌƌies kept goiŶg past aŶd theǇ didŶ͛t  
realise that, as they were going past, it was making it like a tidal wave. So it ǁas sǁishiŶg, aŶd I thought, ͚I doŶ͛t 
believe this͛.  Like – with the council – you would have thought between them and the police they would have the 
seŶse… ΀To Đlose the ƌoad΁.  We͛ǀe got thƌee ŵaiŶ ďuses that ƌuŶ oŶ that back road.  One of them runs every 10 
minutes, the other runs every quarter of an hour, so you imagine that every 10 or 15 minutes, what water was getting 
squished into your house. It was unbelievable. It has been horrendous, really (͚AŵaŶda͛, ‘esideŶt Interview, 19th 
December 2007). 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, If ǁe folloǁ ƌesideŶts͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes ďeǇoŶd that of the oƌigiŶal shoĐk aŶd ďlaŵe aŶd iŶto the loŶgeƌ-term 
pƌoĐess of ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ, ǁe ĐaŶ see eǀideŶĐe of Ǉet aŶotheƌ featuƌe of ƌisk soĐietǇ eǆhiďited ďǇ the ͚ďefoƌe͛ ƌesearch 
project – namely, the individualisation of risk and its consequences.  
Despite the severity of the event itself, the accounts of the diarists showed that most of them were able to deal 
constructively with their initial situations in ways that enabled them to make a start on the process of recovering 
their homes.  It was what happened next – the struggles with insurers, loss adjusters and builders – that caused 
real problems for their emotional and mental wellbeing.  Indeed, the research shows that the individualised way in 
which flood recovery is managed, with residents having to deal with as many as 15 different companies and 
organisations during the repairs to their home, resulted in very mixed experiences for the diarists.  
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 Diarists͛ names have been anonymised 
7
 i.e. 1 chance in 30 in any given year (assuming that probability is constant and that events are independent from year to year: 
Pielke Jnr. 1999) 
 One example of this process was the uncertainty surrounding what would be repaired and how and when these 
repairs would take place. Even for home owners with full insurance and obvious evidence of water damage there 
were huge variations in the extent, timing and standards of the work, depending on which insurer the person was 
with and, in turn, which restoration and building companies were called in. In this way, even neighbours living next 
door to each other would be treated in completely different ways. These uncertainties were even greater for 
teŶaŶts oƌ those ǁhose hoŵes ǁeƌe affeĐted ďǇ ͚seĐoŶdaƌǇ͛ floodiŶg – a phenomenon where the water entered 
below the floorboards, causing structural damage to the home, which was sometimes only detected months later 
(Whittle et al. ϮϬϭϬͿ. IŶ suĐh ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes, ƌesideŶts had to ǁatĐh aŶd ǁait ǁhile ͚eǆpeƌts͛ fƌoŵ the ďuildiŶg, 
surveying and insurance industries debated the cause and/or significance of damage to their homes and whether 
their repairs would be covered by their insurance (e.g. was the damage caused by the flood or by the 
householdeƌ͛s failuƌe to ŵaiŶtaiŶ a daŵp-proof course?).  The faĐt that diffeƌeŶt ͚eǆpeƌts͛ adǀised the 
implementation of different restoration techniques (sometimes in adjoining properties) only added to 
householdeƌs͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of ĐoŶfusioŶ aŶd fƌustƌatioŶ; paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ if theǇ fouŶd theŵselǀes uŶaďle to iŶflueŶĐe 
aŶ iŶsuƌaŶĐe ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s aĐĐeptaŶĐe of oŶe eǆpeƌt͛s opiŶioŶ oǀeƌ aŶotheƌ͛s. 
Figure 2 provides an example of how it felt for one resident to be an individual trapped in the middle of dealing 
with all these different companies and agencies. This timeline is taken from the self-assessed scores that Caroline 
gave herself in the front of her diary during a period from 10
th
 December to 5
th
 May 2008 (see methodology 
section for more details of this self-assessed scoring process). 
<<<Figure 2 about here>>>   
As Figure 2 illustrates, as well as producing the need to deal with recovery agents, the management of the 
recovery process was occurring simultaneously with the need to continue everyday life; washing and shopping 
needed to be done; jobs needed to be held down and dependants needed to be caƌed foƌ.  The ͚negotiations͛8 with 
flood recovery agents merely added to these pressures.  This meant that at times some individuals were laden with 
more responsibility than they felt able to bear.  Importantly, however, the research identified that this tendency 
toward mental and physical overburden did not mean that these individuals were psychologically weak, inherently 
͚ǀulŶeƌaďle͛ oƌ iŶ soŵe ǁaǇ iŶĐapaďle of dealiŶg ǁith flood hazaƌds.  No.  These Đases of stƌaiŶ ǁeƌe fouŶd to 
relate much more to the fact that people were being retraumatised by the way they perceived themselves to be 
being dealt with by the formal recovery agents.  IŶ effeĐt, people ǁho had ͚survived͛ [their expression] the flood, 
often found themselves strained by the need to generate the additional tenacity that the experience of flood 
recovery required of them.  The following short diary extract illustrates this issue by showing how one diarist 
described a single exchange with her insurance company, in which she had complained about the service provided 
by an insurance company-endorsed loss adjuster:  
Day off today after working on previous Saturday.  I call insurance department and speak to them regarding my 
concerns.  I get really upset and have trouble explaining without crying as he says he will call loss adjustor for his side 
of the story!  This comment really upsets me as why should I lie?  I insist for his address to post my six page letter and 
all the copies of emails when [name] has said he will pay rent and storage and never has.  I feel absolutely exhaus ted 
after this call and feel quite shaken (͚Lauƌa͛, DiaƌǇ eŶtƌǇ, MoŶdaǇ Ϯϯƌd JuŶe ϮϬϬϴ). 
Understanding the distress caused by this individualised and longer-term recovery process is important for several 
reasons: First, for many people, this is how the realitǇ of ͚ŵakiŶg spaĐe foƌ ǁateƌ͛ is aĐtuallǇ eǆpeƌieŶĐed iŶ 
practice, at least at present.  It is one thing to ask people to take more responsibility for managing their flood risk 
but our data shows that, for those who do not know of – or cannot bear the burden of – such responsibility and 
make the necessary changes to their homes and lifestyles, the consequences can be severe.  Secondly, there are 
other important longer-term implications of this shift to individual responsibility, which relate to risk and 
resilience, and we explore these in the following section. 
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 „Negotiation‟ was a phrase that was introduced with some irony by a diarist.  He recounted a conversation with a 
loss adjuster during which he realised that householders were not being compensated in any uniform manner, but 
instead whatever “deal” they received was in fact open to, negotiation.  This is an issue that raises questions about 
whether those who are less able to negotiate for whatever reason would be disproportionately likely to obtain less in 
terms of a final compensation payment than perhaps they were due. 
Discussion: Understanding risk and resilience 
The preceding sections have drawn on data from two research projects to illustrate some of the complexity 
inherent within the puďliĐ͛s ŵultiple uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs of flood ƌisk aŶd ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ.  Whilst BeĐk͛s Risk Society 
thesis (1992) might not be immediately considered as applicable, the argument has been laid out in a way that 
suggests that local flood risks could be understood from a Risk Society perspective, particularly in their terms as 
drivers of social reflexivity.  Using this perspective is not altogether straightforward.  It is, for example, true that 
not everyone is as equally vulnerable to flood hazards as they are to the ŵoƌe tƌaditioŶal of BeĐk͛s teĐhŶologiĐal 
͚iĐoŶs of destƌuĐtioŶ͛ ;e.g. ŶuĐleaƌ ŵeltdoǁŶͿ.  IŶ ƌelatioŶ to this ͚lesseƌ͛ hazaƌd of floodiŶg soŵe people ǁill 
inevitably have access to resources (physical, social or financial), sufficient to mitigate their exposure and/or 
vulnerabilities.  However, the experiences of flood-exposed and flood-affected populations reveal some interesting 
aspects of social reflexivity, which could be suggested to underpin wider public opinions about flood risks and, 
specifically, who they perceive to be responsible for managing them.   
The gradual progression of flood policy in England and Wales over the past century has occurred concurrently to 
the significant development of many riverside and coastal communities.  As a direct result of these policies, the 
structural defences in all the research sites investigated in this paper are currently regarded as having at least a 1 
in 200 standard of sea-flood protection (East Lindsay District Council 2005, Morecambe Bay Shoreline 
Management Plan Partnership 1999), and in Hull an equivalent main-river hazard protection too (i.e. from the 
River Humber: Hull City Council 2007).  However, due to the legacy of past planning standards and institutional 
arrangements which could in retrospect be considered inadequate (Environment Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee 2008), surface-water flood protection standards tend to be lower by almost an order of magnitude. 
Yet regardless of what protection standards are designed in
9
, from the perspective of the flood-hazard exposed, 
phǇsiĐal stƌuĐtuƌes aŶd iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌe aƌe Ŷeǀeƌ ͚Ŷeutƌal͛.  Whetheƌ it is a ͚Ŷouƌished͛ ďeaĐh, a ĐoŶĐƌete seaǁall oƌ 
a tarmaced-over storm drain, these objectively observable landscape features can act to provide reassurance or 
concern to these people.  Whilst apparently badly-maintained measures (e.g. blocked drains) provide a focus for 
feelings of blame, reassuring features (e.g. massive seawalls) allow the perception that someone [else] is largely 
responsible for keeping flood hazards at bay.  Surprisingly, the presence of these respective blame and trust-in-
authority factors effectively legitimises the household-level investment of emotional and financial capital; in the 
sense that, to paraphrase, ͚someone else is responsible for protecting us͛.  Thus, houses in at-risk locations 
ĐoŶtiŶue to ďe ŵade iŶto hoŵes, aŶd householdeƌs͛ ĐoŶtiŶue to ŵake aspiƌatioŶs foƌ a futuƌe in that place; 
without the need to engage with the potentially uncomfortable realisation that they too have responsibility for 
reducing their own vulnerability.     
From this perspective it becomes easier to posit that the shift toward the new FRM paradigm (and its inherent 
drive toward personal responsibility) could be perceived by this exposed public to be an example of what Beck 
(1995) would term, the ͚organised irresponsibility’ of those ǁho ĐoŶfiguƌe F‘M͛s formal institutions.  Using this 
lens, this term could be applied to the process whereby, in acknowledging that floods are too indeterminate to 
͚kŶoǁ͛ oƌ to eŶtiƌelǇ pƌeǀeŶt, the FRM authorities have positioned themselves as simultaneously responsible and 
yet unaccountable.  This is a position that allows actors (such as the Environment Agency and Local Authorities), to 
be perceived as, on the one hand, taking responsibility for the ĐƌeatioŶ of elaďoƌate ͚ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛ development 
plans, whilst on the other ceding to the populations an increased personal responsibility for coping with the 
extreme hazards, which would be capable of sundering any householder͛s home and/or future aspirations over the 
course of just a few stormy hours. 
Turning the perspective from the exposed toward the flood-affected provides different insights, but ones that are 
just as relevant to those who seek to reduce future flood impacts by attempting to engage the public with their 
risks. In the first instance, a kind of resilience was engendered in many residents who acquired new skills as a 
ƌesult of haǀiŶg to ͚fight͛ theiƌ ĐoƌŶeƌ ǁith the ǀaƌious ĐoŵpaŶies aŶd agencies that they were dealing with. 
However, as described above, there must be major ethical questions around any form of resilience that has its 
roots in the unnecessary suffering of residents. Certainly, if the experiences outlined above are anything to go by 
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 Always remembering that a residual risk will remain 
theŶ it ǁould ďe haƌd to aƌgue that the ďeŶefits of suĐh ͚ƌesilieŶĐe͛ outǁeigh the Đost to the faŵilǇ, iŶdiǀidual aŶd 
community as a whole. 
EƋuallǇ, ǁe ĐaŶ thiŶk of the diaƌists͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes iŶ the light of BeĐk͛s ͚safetǇ sǇsteŵs͛, which allows us to include 
the consideration of market-ďased sǇsteŵs, like pƌiǀate iŶsuƌaŶĐe. At pƌeseŶt, a ͚GeŶtleŵeŶ͛s AgƌeeŵeŶt͛ 
between the Government and the insurance industry means that flood insurance will be provided to households 
exposed to an annual flood probability of no worse than 1 in 75 years until 2013; dependent on the Government 
continuing to invest in flood risk reduction and management measures (Association of British Insurers 2008, Huber 
2004).  In line with this, prior to the flooding, all the Hull projeĐt͛s diaƌists ǁould haǀe had aĐĐess to ĐoŵŵeƌĐial 
flood insurance.  The fact that most of these people did indeed have such cover was not, however, sufficient for 
many of them to avoid suffering significant and repeated worry over whether their claims would be met, or 
whether the future cost of maintaining cover – now that they had submitted a flood-related claim – would remain 
affordable: 
We ǁeŶt oŶ the ǁeď lookiŶg foƌ iŶsuƌaŶĐes aŶd… otheƌ iŶsuƌaŶĐe ĐoŵpaŶies doŶ͛t particularly want to take you on 
and the premiums were that high it was unbelievable. So we stuck with the same insurance company and they took 
us ďaĐk oŶ aŶd the pƌeŵiuŵ oŶlǇ ǁeŶt up £5Ϭ aŶd that ǁasŶ͛t a problem. But the excess has gone up: £5,000 we 
have to pay on contents and £5,000 on buildings. So if the same thing happened again we͛ǀe £ϭϬ,ϬϬϬ to fiŶd ďefoƌe 
ǁe staƌt. AŶd ǁheƌe do ǁe pluĐk that fƌoŵ? Wheƌe do ǁe get that fƌoŵ? We haǀeŶ͛t got £ϭϬ,ϬϬϬ. Oƌ do ǁe saǀe 
aŶǇthiŶg at all oƌ do ǁe liteƌallǇ just let the ǁhole lot go aŶd saǇ it͛s all gone and claim what we can and just have 
everything lesser? (͚LeaŶŶe͛, ƌesideŶt Gƌoup disĐussioŶ, JulǇ ϭϳth ϮϬϬϴ) 
LeaŶŶe͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐe pƌoǀides aŶ opportunity to use BeĐk͛s ;ϭϵϵϮͿ ͚aƌďiteƌ of ƌisk͛ characterisation of the insurance 
industry as an appropriate lens through which to reflect on this particular ͚safetǇ sǇsteŵ͛ oŶ offeƌ iŶ the UK.  This is 
because, given its current structure, problems such as rising premiums or large excesses become the inevitable 
result of the UK͛s highly individualised, market-driven insurance system, where risks – and premiums – are 
calculated on a case-by-case basis, with those perceived to be at higher risk (such as those whose houses have 
been flooded in the past) paying more.  In such an arena, insurance availability increasingly becomes a primary 
concern for anyone living on the floodplain, as well as for those considering buying, selling or developing property 
in such a place.  From this perspective, the development and sustainability of floodplain life could indeed be said to 
be iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt upoŶ iŶsuƌaŶĐe iŶdustƌǇ ͚aƌďitƌatioŶ͛.  Such a system is in complete contrast to France, 
where solidarity and mutuality are the guiding principles.  In France, compulsory cover for disaster risk has been 
shared since 1982 amongst all policy holders with an identical additional percentage premium paid on top of the 
assessed premium for fire insurance (French Disaster Reduction Platform 2007). 
If the insurance system stays in its present form in the UK then, taking into account the projected increase in 
eǆtƌeŵe ǁeatheƌ eǀeŶts ƌesultiŶg fƌoŵ Đliŵate ĐhaŶge, it staŶds to ƌeasoŶ that the Ŷuŵďeƌ of people iŶ LeaŶŶe͛s 
situation will increase every year. Such a scenario is deeply undesirable given that the availability of affordable 
insurance is often argued to be one of the most important pillars in building resilience for the future (Clark 1998, 
Pelling 2003b, Whyley et al. 1998) and that the poorest residents will likely be impacted first (Burby et al. 2003). 
Insurance also has another important impact on risk and resilience, in the form of its relationship to resilient 
repair. The Hull study showed that the potential mitigation of future risks fell as a secondary priority to an 
insurance industry, who apparently favoured straightforward restoration over the installation of resilience 
measures during the repairs (several diarists explained that installing such measures was forbidden by insurance 
companies as this would have ĐoŶstituted aŶ ͚iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt͛Ϳ.  Foƌ the ŵajoƌitǇ, the iŶsuƌaŶĐe ͚eǆpeƌieŶĐe͛ ǁas 
one of putting things back as they were, with any incorporation of resilience measures (e.g. concrete floors) 
ƌesultiŶg ŵoƌe fƌoŵ a paƌtiĐulaƌ householdeƌ͛s teŶaĐitǇ oƌ eǆpeƌtise, thaŶ ďeĐause the ͚eǆpeƌt͛ tƌiuŵǀiƌate of 
insurer, loss adjuster, and/or contracted builder saw sufficient value in them to insist on their incorporation into 
the rebuild (see: Association of British Insurers 2009).   
Hoǁeǀeƌ, this ǁilliŶgŶess to foƌego ƌesilieŶĐe ŵeasuƌes as too eǆpeŶsiǀe ǁas Ŷot all the iŶdustƌǇ͛s doiŶg.  Whilst 
the principle behind resilience measures was widely accepted by the diarists, their overriding perceptions were 
that the efficacy of some of these measures was largely uncertain and that any personal expenditure on them 
might not be recognised in any lowering of the cost of insurance premiums.  Accordingly, it became relatively easy 
for some householders to allow pragmatism to shape their view of a future, wherein, even though the hazard has 
lost its solely-putative status forever, a refurbished house, bearing no physical reminders of risk levels (e.g. raised 
electrical sockets), can slowly be returned to a status of home (Harries & Borrows 2007).  Through this process, the 
status quo could be said to be rebuilt into the very fabric of the newly-dried and refurbished buildings, even if it 
did not quite resettle iŶto the ŵiŶds aŶd iŶto the ͚new normality͛10 of those living in them. 
Conclusion: Moving forward in the [flood] risk society 
In this chapter we have argued that the transition to FRM approaches can be viewed as an example of the kind of 
Risk Society described by Beck (1992). Decades of structural, instrumental approaches to flood defence have 
resulted in an expansion of homes onto flood plains and exposed coastal areas. We have argued that the creation 
of such homes, and the engineering structures that contain them, amounts to an unwritten contract which has 
fostered a belief that science and technology can and should protect us from the dangers that lie on the other side 
of the flood walls.  The large number of severe floods experienced in recent years, however, illustrates that such 
faith is increasingly misplaced. This has led to a political recognition that escalating expenditure on flood defences 
is neither financially nor socially sustainable, thus prompting a move to a new approach based on the need to live 
with flooding through adaptation and resilience. Here, we have argued that a crucial element of this approach 
involves a shift of responsibility onto individuals. The research results we have described show how this creates a 
range of ethical and practical challenges for the ways in which risk and resilience are played out, both now and in 
the future.  
So how do we move forward from here? The situation we have described in this chapter is complex and there is 
little to be gained from attempting to apportion blame to specific individuals or organisations. However, it is 
possible to suggest a number of potential avenues for change. First, within both studies a particular focus was 
afforded to the importance of public engagement and to challenging the effectiveness of the modus operandi of 
the recovery organisations and institutions.  Regarding the flood-exposed, principal importance was given to the 
need for iterative engagement processes to be developed, in order that wider introspection can be encouraged on 
the part of the at-risk publics.  Such approaches are also supported by Ronan and Johnston (2005), who promote 
the idea of ͚ĐhaŶge-talk͛.  IŶ a hazaƌds ĐoŶteǆt, this is siŵplǇ the tǇpe of ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ that pƌoǀokes paƌtiĐipaŶts to 
ƌeĐoŶsideƌ theiƌ peƌĐeptioŶs of ǁhat ͚safe͛ ƌeallǇ ŵeaŶs to theŵ.  It effeĐtiǀelǇ pƌoǀides iŶfoƌŵatioŶ that pƌoduĐes 
a discrepancy between someone͛s eǆistiŶg uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of ;e.g.Ϳ a hazaƌd – as perhaps benign – and the new 
information that suggests a more malignant presence about which action can and should be taken. However, it is 
not just the public who need to learn. Effective public engagement allows policy makers and practitioners to 
benefit from the local knowledge of residents, and an increasing number of research projects point to the 
importance of creating spaces where residents can get involved in making decisions about their local environment; 
including those made around flood-risk management (Lane et al. in press, Steinführer & Kuhlicke 2009, Whittle et 
al. 2010).  
Secondly, if we are serious about making space for water, the Hull study shows that we need to accept that floods 
will happen and, as a result, we must pay more attention to how people can be supported more effectively during 
the recovery process.  We do not have space here for a full discussion of how to go about this.  However, 
elsewhere we have aƌgued that it is iŵpoƌtaŶt to addƌess the ͚ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ gap͛, ǁhiĐh sees ƌesideŶts tƌapped iŶ the 
middle of a very individualising process and having to negotiate themselves through the maze of agencies and 
companies involved in flood recovery (Whittle et al. 2010).  We have also proposed that recovery agents, such as 
the insurance industry, should be considered as more than just market-based businesses.  Whether a hazard 
strikes at the household level or across an entire geographical community, the survivors will need efficient and fair 
treatment in order that they do not suffer adverse consequences for longer than is necessary.  The development of 
aŶ ethiĐ of Đaƌe ǁithiŶ this paƌtiĐulaƌ ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ ͚ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛, thƌough ǁhiĐh pƌofessioŶal staŶdaƌds Đould ďe 
adhered to throughout the course of any recovery period, should be regarded as vital. 
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 The phrase „new normality‟ was used by a respondent severely affected by the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease disaster in 
Cumbria (Mort et al. 2005) 
FiŶallǇ, it is iŵpoƌtaŶt to ĐoŶsideƌ hoǁ ouƌ ͚safetǇ sǇsteŵs͛ Đould ďe ƌeshaped iŶ oƌdeƌ to pƌoŵote a faiƌeƌ, ŵoƌe 
effective sharing of risk and in order to help build resilience for the future. As we have indicated here, this could 
include revisiting the terms of insurance in order to ensure the continuation of more affordable, equitable 
premiums, as well as working with insurers and builders to encourage more resilient repair. 
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Plate 1: An example of the ‘stripping out’ process endured by many residents in Hull after the 2007 flood: 
where the affected property has been stripped back to its bare structure in order to facilitate repair (NB. In 




































of responses but users 
rather than producers of 
knowledge (e.g. Local 
Planning Authorities) 
Directly involved in 
knowledge 
production (e.g. Pitt; 
Defra policy makers) 
Figuƌe ϭ: The ͚ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ tƌough͛ ĐoŶĐept applied to the soĐial peƌĐeptioŶs of flood-risk management in 
coastal towns.   
o Solid line refers to perceptions of surface water flood risks.   
o Dashed line refers to perceptions of sea-flood risks. 
 
 Source: Deeming (2008): original concept, MacKenzie (1990) 
 Figure 2: CaƌoliŶe͛s timeline; an example of a recovery journey (Whittle et al. 2010) 
 
